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Abstract 
In Bangladesh, pervasive poverty has kept generations of families from sending 
their children to school, and without education, their children￿s future will be a 
distressing echo of their own.  Many children from poor families in Bangladesh do not 
attend school either because their families cannot afford books and other school 
materials, or because the children contribute to their family￿s livelihood and cannot be 
spared.  In some areas, there is also a lack of schools.  Among those who enter primary 
school, only about 40 percent of them complete it.  The commendable success of the 
Food for Education (FFE) program of the Government of Bangladesh has led to larger 
classes, but do these crowded classrooms crowd out learning? 
How does FFE work? 
The Government of Bangladesh launched the FFE program in 1993.  The FFE 
program provided a free monthly ration of foodgrains to poor families in rural areas if 
their children enrolled in primary school, and maintained an 85 percent attendance rate.  
The family could consume the grain or sell it and use the cash to meet other expenses.  
Before the program was terminated in June 2002, the FFE program covered about 27 
percent of all primary schools and enrolled about one-third of all primary school students.  
FFE beneficiary students accounted for about 13 percent of all students in primary 
schools in Bangladesh.  The cost of the program (including the value of foodgrains) was 
approximately US$37 per beneficiary student per year.  A two-step targeting mechanism 
was used, selecting poor areas, then poor households within those areas. 
Data from school and household surveys conducted in Bangladesh by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in September-October 2000 were 
used to evaluate the FFE program.  The surveys included primary schools with and 
without the FFE program, and a cross section of households including program 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries.  The sample includes 600 households in 60 villages in 
30 unions in 10 thanas, and 110 schools in the same 30 unions from which the household   iii
sample was drawn.  In addition, a standard academic achievement test, designed to assess 
the quality of education received by students, was given to students in both FFE and non-
FFE schools. 
What was the impact of FFE on learning? 
IFPRI analysis showed that the FFE program led to increased enrollment and 
class attendance rates, particularly among girls.  However, classrooms of FFE schools 
became more crowded:  on average, classrooms in FFE schools had 22 percent more 
students (67 students) than classrooms in non-FFE schools (55 students).  Within FFE 
schools, the average test score is lower for FFE beneficiaries than nonbeneficiary 
students, which brings down the aggregate score in FFE schools.  In non-FFE schools, 
average test scores of all students are comparable to nonbeneficiaries in FFE schools.  
Boys consistently outperformed girls in the achievement test in all subjects in all types of 
schools, regardless of FFE beneficiary status. 
Does classroom crowding (resource dilution) or the lower ability of FFE children 
(peer effect) affect test scores of non-FFE students in FFE schools?  IFPRI￿s multivariate 
analysis does not support the resource dilution hypothesis.  Class size has no effect on 
student achievement. 
Results of the peer effect analysis, however, show that the learning performance 
of non-FFE students in FFE schools is negatively affected when an average of 44 percent 
of the students in class are FFE beneficiaries.  This is probably due to the teachers having 
to go more slowly to accommodate poorly performing FFE students.  These students 
come from poorer families.  Evidence from household surveys show that children from 
poor families are less likely to have educated parents who could help them in their studies 
at home, afford study materials, and find enough time to do the homework, as many of 
them must contribute to their family￿s livelihood.  Moreover, from birth, these children 
are often deprived of the basic nutritional building blocks that they need in order to learn. 
Nevertheless, there are benefits to non-FFE beneficiaries from being in an FFE 
school because FFE schools must meet certain minimum educational quality standards to   iv
maintain FFE eligibility.  For example, in FFE schools, at least 10 percent of Grade 5 
students must qualify for the national annual scholarship examination.  No such 
performance standards are required for the non-FFE primary schools.  These benefits to 
non-FFE beneficiaries outweigh the negative peer effects up to the point when FFE 
beneficiaries reached 69 percent of the students in the classroom.  After 69 percent, the 
benefits derived from minimum performance standards vanish. 
The overall effect at the community level is measured by the Minimum Learning 
Achievement; the percentage of children in a community who attain a minimum 
achievement score, weighted by the enrolment rate in that community.  The minimum 
learning achievement in FFE communities is higher than in non-FFE communities 
(despite the latter tending to be richer) due to the increased enrollment from FFE.  
Particularly, major benefits accrued to the children from poor families who would not 
have attended school without the FFE program. 
Implications for food assistance programming 
As a food-based social safety net, the FFE program in Bangladesh served a wider 
purpose than simply providing the poor with immediate sustenance through take-home 
food rations, important as that is.  It has empowered children from poor families with 
education, thereby paving their pathway out of poverty. 
The FFE enrollment increase was greater for girls than boys, yet boys consistently 
outperformed girls on the achievement tests.  Having drawn them into school, improving 
the quality of girls￿ education will ultimately strengthen the beneficial effects of women￿s 
education on various family-level outcomes, such as children￿s schooling, child health 
and nutrition, and women￿s fertility. 
The concern that learning performance of non-FFE students in FFE schools may 
be adversely affected by increased class size generated by the FFE program appears to be 
unfounded.  But unchecked, the negative peer effect could hinder student achievement.  
In the FFE program, this was offset by the requirement that FFE schools must meet 
certain minimum educational quality standards in order to maintain their school-level   v
eligibility for the program.  Setting clear standards for performance is important, even at 
the primary level.  Minimum performance standards should be incorporated in the design 
of the recently implemented Primary Education Stipend program (a cash-for-education 
program that has replaced the government￿s FFE program), as well as in the ongoing 
pilot testing of the school-feeding program launched by the Government of Bangladesh 
with support from the World Food Programme. 
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It is hard to overemphasize the importance of quality education for improving the 
welfare of individuals.  In developing countries, providing universal primary education 
connotes a great opportunity to reduce poverty and to promote economic growth.  Quality 
primary education would equip children from poor families with literacy, numeracy, and 
basic problem-solving skills to move out of poverty. 
In Bangladesh, pervasive poverty has kept generations of families from sending 
their children to school, and without education, their children￿s future will be a 
distressing echo of their own.  Many children from poor families in Bangladesh do not 
attend school either because their families cannot afford books, other school materials, or 
clothes, or because the children contribute to their family￿s livelihood and cannot be 
spared.  Among those who enter primary school, only about 40 percent of them complete 
it. 
In an effort to increase primary school enrollment of children from poor families 
and to retain them in school, the Government of Bangladesh launched the Food for 
Education (FFE) program in 1993.  The FFE program provides a free monthly ration of 
foodgrains to poor families in rural areas if their children attend primary school.  Thus, 
the FFE foodgrain ration becomes a monthly income entitlement enabling a child from a 
poor family to go to school.  The family can consume the grain, thus reducing its food 
budget, or it can sell the grain and use the cash to meet other expenses.
1 
A recent evaluation of the Bangladesh￿s FFE program, conducted by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), finds that the program has largely 
fulfilled its objectives of increasing school enrollment, promoting school attendance, and 
preventing dropouts.  The enrollment increase was greater for girls than for boys.  The 
                                                 
1 In June 2002, the Government of Bangladesh terminated the FFE program, and replaced it with the 
Primary Education Stipend program￿a cash-for-education program. 2 
study also finds that the program significantly increases food consumption in the 
beneficiary households (Ahmed and del Ninno 2002). 
There have been a number of other studies that estimated the impact of the FFE 
program on primary school enrollment in Bangladesh.  They all suggest that the program 
has resulted in increased primary school enrollment (Ahmed 2000; Ahmed and Billah 
1994; Arends-Kuenning and Amin 2000; BIDS 1997; DPC 2000; Khandker 1996; 
Ravallion and Wodon 1997).  However, because of increased enrollment and class 
attendance rates, FFE school classrooms are more crowded than non-FFE school 
classrooms.  Consequently, there have been concerns about the deterioration of the 
quality of education in FFE schools. 
In this paper, we examine whether the FFE program has lowered the academic 
performance of the students attending FFE schools.  The paper is organized as follows.  
Section 2 puts our research issue in perspective by reviewing literature on the effect of 
classroom size on learning.  Section 3 provides an overview of the FFE program.  Section 
4 discusses the data that are used in our empirical work.  Section 5 contains the findings 
of our empirical analysis.  We then present our conclusions in Section 6. 
2.  Review of Literature on the Issue 
In this section we review the state of knowledge about the effects of class size on 
student achievement.  Currently, a very active debate is occurring in the economics of 
education literature on the question of whether large class sizes have a negative impact on 
student learning.  On one side, Hanushek (2003) makes the argument that few published 
studies have found the expected negative and significant impact of class size on student 
learning, indicating that school resources are not utilized well.  Hanushek (2003) notes 
that of 276 published U.S. estimates, 14 percent found positive and statistically 
significant impacts of teacher/pupil ratios on student performance, but an equal 
percentage found negative and statistically significant impacts.  Seventy-two percent of 
the estimates found statistically insignificant effects.  In developing countries, Hanushek 3 
reviewed 30 estimates, of which an equal percentage, 27 percent, found positive and 
significant effects of the teacher/pupil ratio on student achievement, as found negative 
and significant effects. 
On the other side of the class size debate, researchers argue that most published 
studies are seriously flawed and therefore, one should focus attention on the few well-
designed studies in the literature.  Krueger (2002) argues that if one analyzes the 
published studies, giving more weight to the well-designed studies, class size has a 
significant and negative impact on achievement test scores.  Glewwe (2002) is highly 
critical of conventional studies of the impact of class size on student achievement test 
scores.  He points out that most studies do not properly control for the unobserved 
characteristics that influence class size and achievement.  For example, governments 
might provide more resources in areas that have low schooling attainment compared to 
areas with high schooling attainment.  In this case, regression analysis that did not control 
for the government￿s resource allocation might find that larger class sizes are associated 
with higher school achievement.  Glewwe cites two well-designed studies in South Africa 
(Case and Deaton 1999) and in Israel (Angrist and Lavy 1999) that both find significant 
positive impacts of smaller class sizes on student achievement. 
There are, however, reasons why smaller class sizes might not be associated with 
higher achievement test scores.  Lazear (1999) argues that what matters to classroom 
performance is the number of disruptions.  As class size increases, the probability that a 
disruption will occur tends to increase, other things being equal.  However, disruptive 
students might be placed in smaller sized classes, in an effort to monitor their behavior.  
Hanushek (2003) interprets data from the STAR project, an experiment in the U.S. state 
of Tennessee, where school children were randomly assigned to classes with varying size, 
as showing that there is a one-time benefit to small class sizes in kindergarten, which 
probably represents a socialization effect.  Once students are socialized to behave 
properly in school, there is little benefit to small class sizes. 
In a study on determinants of primary education quality in Francophone Africa, 
Michaelowa (2001) finds a positive effect on of the number of students in each class on 4 
student achievement up to a class size of 62 students.  Above this size, however, the 
effect becomes increasingly negative.  Michaelowa then cites Hanushek (1998), and 
Mingat and Suchaut (1998) who find that, below a certain limit, an increase in class size 
would not lower student achievement. 
3.  Overview of the FFE Program 
Origin of the FFE Program 
In 1992, the Government of Bangladesh closed down the Palli (rural) Rationing 
program, one of the largest channels in the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS).  
The government was providing subsidies equivalent to US$60 million per year to run the 
program.  However, about 70 percent of the subsidized foodgrain (mostly rice) was going 
to those who were not poor, i.e., ineligible to receive the subsidy (Ahmed 1992).  The 
high cost of subsidy and heavy leakage to the nonpoor motivated its abolition. 
Following the demise of Palli Rationing, the government commissioned a 
working group, chaired by IFPRI, to review the options for developing food programs 
that would reach the neediest people in a cost-effective manner.  Drawing on the working 
group￿s suggestions, the government launched a large-innovative pilot program, Food for 
Education, in July 1993. 
Expansion of the FFE Program in Relation to Overall Primary Education 
Table 1 shows the trends in primary education in Bangladesh during the 10 years 
from 1989/90 to 1998/99.  Over this period, the number of primary schools increased by 
43 percent; teachers employed in primary schools, by 39 percent; and students in primary 
schools, by 59 percent.  Almost the entire expansion in primary education during the 
period was due to the growth in private-sector schools.  There was a sudden and big surge 
in the number of nongovernment primary schools, which increased from 13,043 in 5 
1992/93 to 28,640 in 1993/94.  This increase was in response to a new government 
directive that provided incentives to rural communities to build new schools. 
Table 1  Number of government and nongovernment primary schools, teachers, and 
students 

















            (thousands) 
1989/90 37,760    8,023  45,783 162,237 37,819  200,056 10,494 1,851  12,345 
1990/91 37,659    10,487  48,146 160,744 42,103 202,847 10,722  2,313  13,035 
1991/92 38,097    11,867  49,964 158,180 50,091 208,271 11,157  2,560  13,717 
1992/93 37,855    13,043  50,898 160,497 54,282 214,779 11,239  2,963  14,202 
1993/94 37,528    28,640  66,168 159,538 82,714 242,252 11,266  3,919  15,185 
1994/95 37,717    24,900  62,617 161,251 87,532 248,783 11,826  4,603  16,429 
1995/96 37,752    23,831  61,583 161,026 88,689 249,715 12,026  5,042  17,068 
1996/97 37,348    24,290  61,638 161,597 88,331 249,928 12,248  5,071  17,319 
1997/98 41,248    24,987  66,235 160,677 90,313 250,990 12,423  5,206  17,629 
1998/99 39,709  25,901  65,610 179,710 99,282 278,992 13,521  6,091  19,612 
Source:  Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). ￿Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh,￿ various issues. 
Note:  Nongovernment schools include (1) registered nongovernment primary school, (2) high school-attached primary 
school, (3) experimental school, (4) Ebtadayee Madrasa (EM), (5) high madrasa attached EM, (6) kindergarten 
school, (7) satellite school, and (8) community school. 
 
Data in Table 1 also indicate that the average number of students per teacher in all 
primary schools increased from 62 in 1989/90 to 70 in 1998/99.  There are more students 
per teacher in government schools than in nongovernment schools.  In 1989/90, 
government schools had a student/teacher ratio of 65, while in nongovernment schools 
the ratio was 49.  This ratio increased to 75 for government schools and 61 for 
nongovernment schools in 1998/99. 
The FFE program started in 1993 in 460 unions, one union in each of the 460 
rural thanas in Bangladesh.
2  The program expanded to 1,247 unions by 2000.  From 
                                                 
2 The administrative structure of Bangladesh consists of divisions, districts, thanas, and unions, in 
decreasing order by size.  There are five divisions, 64 districts, 489 thanas (of which 29 are in four city 
corporations), and 4,451 unions (all rural).  The FFE program was implemented in all 460 rural thanas. 6 
1993/94 to 1999/00, the number of primary schools covered by the program increased by 
262 percent and the number of students in the program schools increased by 245 percent.  
About 40 percent of the students in FFE schools received FFE foodgrains.  Hence, out of 
the 5.2 million students enrolled in schools with the FFE program in 2000, 2.1 million 
students were FFE beneficiaries.  About 2 million families benefited from the program in 
2000.  Before the program was terminated in June 2002, FFE had covered about 27 
percent of all primary schools and enrolled about one-third of all primary school students 
in Bangladesh.  FFE beneficiary students accounted for about 13 percent of all students in 
primary schools. 
In 1993/94, the FFE program started at a cost of 683 million taka (US$17 
million),
3 involving distribution of 79,553 metric tons of foodgrains.  By 1999/00, the 
annual cost increased to 3.94 billion taka (US$77 million), and the distribution of 
foodgrains to 285,973 metric tons.  The cost of the program (including the value of 
foodgrains) in 2000 translates into 1,897 taka (US$37.19) per beneficiary student per 
year.  The share of the FFE program in total expenditure for primary education in the 
country increased from 4.7 percent in 1993/94 to 19.9 percent in 1997/98. 
Salient Features of the FFE Program 
The FFE program was funded by the Government of Bangladesh.  The program 
was one of the foodgrain distribution channels of PFDS and was administered by the 
Primary and Mass Education Division (PMED). 
The FFE program used a two-step targeting mechanism.  First, two to three 
unions that were economically backward and had a low literacy rate were selected from 
each of the 460 rural thanas.  The program covered all government, registered 
nongovernment, community (low-cost), and satellite primary schools, and one Ebtedayee 
Madrasa (religion-based primary school) in these selected unions.  Second, within each 
                                                 
3 The official exchange rate for the taka, the currency of Bangladesh, was 40.25 taka per US$1.00 in June 
1994.  The exchange rate was 51.00 taka per $1.00 in June 2000. 7 
union, households with primary-school-age children became eligible for FFE benefits if 
they met at least one of the following four targeting criteria:  
1.  A landless or near-landless household that owns less than half an acre of land; 
2.  The household head￿s principal occupation is day laborer; 
3.  The head of household is a female (widowed, separated from husband, divorced, 
or having a disabled husband); or 
4.  The household earns its living from low-income professions (such as, fishing, 
pottery, weaving, blacksmithing, and cobbling). 
A household that met the targeting criteria, but was covered under another 
targeted food-based program of the government (such as the Vulnerable Group 
Development program or the Rural Development program), was not eligible to receive 
FFE foodgrains. 
If a household was selected to participate in the FFE program, it was entitled to 
receive a free ration of up to 20 kilograms of wheat or 16 kilograms of rice per month for 
sending its children to a primary school.
4  If a household had only one primary-school-
age child (6-10 years) who attended school, then that household was entitled to receive 
15 kilograms of wheat or 12 kilograms of rice per month.  To be eligible for 20 kilograms 
of wheat or 16 kilograms of rice, a household was required to send more than one child, 
and all primary-school-age children, to school.  To maintain their eligibility, children had 
to attend 85 percent of total classes in a month.  Thus, the total foodgrain allotment to a 
school could vary from month to month, depending on the variation in the number of 
students who met the attendance requirement. 
Based on the targeting criteria, a School Managing Committee (SMC) and a 
Compulsory Primary Education Ward Committee jointly prepared a list of FFE 
beneficiary households in every union at the beginning of each year.  Due to resource 
                                                 
4 Of the total quantity of FFE foodgrain distributed from 1997/98 to1999/00, wheat accounted for about 64 
percent, and rice, about 36 percent. 8 
constraints, the total number of beneficiary households was identified so that no more 
than 40 percent of students received FFE rations.  The beneficiary list was recorded in a 
registry book.  The headmaster of the school, who was a member and secretary of the 
SMC, was the custodian of this registry book.  Each FFE-enlisted household received a 
ration card that entitled it to receive the monthly free foodgrain ration. 
In the beginning of each month, the headmaster prepared a list of students from 
beneficiary households who had met the 85 percent attendance requirement in the 
previous month.  Based on this list, the SMC calculated the foodgrain requirement for the 
school for that month and prepared a procurement request.  The Thana Education Officer 
certified the procurement request and then forwarded it to the Thana Controller of Food, 
an official of the Ministry of Food.  Each union had a designated private grain dealer who 
distributed FFE foodgrains to all beneficiary households in that union.  Based on the 
procurement requests, the Thana Controller of Food issued a delivery order to the 
Ministry of Food￿s Local Supply Depot to provide all grain dealers in the thana with 
monthly supplies of FFE foodgrains for distribution to all beneficiary households living 
in that thana.  Each beneficiary student￿s parent or guardian holding the FFE ration card 
picked up the monthly ration on a day specified by the school.  Designated officials were 
responsible to supervise the foodgrain distribution (PMED 2000). 
4.  Data 
Our data come from school and household surveys conducted in Bangladesh by 
IFPRI in September-October 2000 for an evaluation of the FFE program.  The surveys 
included primary schools with and without the FFE program, and a cross section of 
households including program beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. 
The sample includes 600 households in 60 villages in 30 unions in 10 thanas, and 
110 schools in the same 30 unions from which the household sample was drawn.  First, 
the sampling process randomly selected 10 thanas with probability proportional to size 
(PPS), based on thana-level population data from the 1991 census.  Second, two FFE 9 
unions and one non-FFE union were randomly selected per thana.  Third, two villages 
from each union were randomly selected with PPS using village-level population data 
from the 1991 census.  A complete census of the households was carried out in each of 
the selected villages.  Then, 10 households that had at least one primary-school-age child 
(6 to 12 years old) were randomly selected in each village from the census list of 
households. 
Only those schools attended by the children in the sample households were 
selected for the school survey.  A total of 110 primary schools (70 FFE and 40 non-FFE 
schools) were surveyed. 
Several questionnaires were used to survey primary schools with and without the 
FFE program, a cross section of households including program beneficiaries and 
nonbeneficiaries, FFE foodgrain dealers, program implementing officials, and FFE and 
non-FFE communities.  In addition, a village census questionnaire collected information 
on household demography, school enrollment, literacy, and FFE participation from 
17,134 households. 
The household questionnaire collected information on a wide variety of topics, 
such as household composition, occupation, education, school participation, dwelling 
characteristics, assets, expenditures, food consumption, anthropometric measurements of 
women and children, and use of the FFE system.  A team of male and female 
interviewers, who completed separate male and female questionnaires for each 
household, administered the household survey. 
The school questionnaire collected information on student enrollment, class 
attendance, dropout and repetition, teacher qualification, school facilities, physical 
characteristics, school expenditures, and FFE program participation. 
Questionnaires administered to foodgrain dealers and program-implementing 
officials captured various operational aspects of the FFE program.  A community survey 
was conducted in all sample villages to collect primary data on union-level and village-
level variables. 10 
In addition to the above-mentioned surveys, the data include children￿s academic 
achievement test scores.  Two sets of test scores are available.  The test was administered 
twice￿once to 3,369 fourth-grade students
5 attending the 110 surveyed FFE and non-
FFE schools,
 and separately to a subsample of 288 children in the household.  
Unfortunately, it was difficult to locate a larger number of children in their households 
who could take the test. 
The test was a standard academic achievement test, designed to assess the quality 
of education received by students.  The household sample of test score data is limited 
because of its small sample size, but it relates to detailed information collected in the 
household survey.  The school sample test score data has the advantage of a large sample 
that relates to school characteristics from the school survey, but lacks information on 
students￿ socioeconomic background.  However, the school test score data can be 
combined with community data and aggregate data from the household survey to control 
somewhat for socioeconomic background.  The test included four subjects￿Bangla, 
English, mathematics, and environmental awareness.  The test was developed by an 
expert from the Institution of Education and Research at the University of Dhaka, and 
was reviewed by researchers from the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and 
IFPRI. 
5.  Analysis of Program Effects on Learning 
In this section we address our research issue￿the effects of the FFE program on 
learning.  We first present the results of the school-level analysis, which is based on data 
collected in the school survey.  We then provide our findings from the household-level 
analysis, using the household survey data. 
                                                 
5 Primary education in Bangladesh includes Grades 1 to 5. 11 
School-Level Analysis 
General Information on Schools 
Observations during the school survey suggest that, in general, nongovernment 
primary school buildings in rural Bangladesh are in much poorer condition than those of 
government primary schools.  Only about 11 percent of the total sample of 
nongovernment schools have a permanent building structure of concrete or tin roofs, 
brick walls, and cement floors, compared to 45 percent of all surveyed government 
schools that have such a structure. 
Table 2 indicates that the average size of FFE schools (in terms of number of 
students per school) is about 27 percent larger than that of non-FFE schools because the 
FFE program entices more children to attend schools.  About half of all students are girls.  
The number of teachers per school (FFE and non-FFE, government and nongovernment) 
ranges from 3.9 to 4.7.  Overall, about 3 out of 10 teachers are female. 
Table 2 also shows that average annual school operating expenses per student 
(excluding teacher salaries) are generally low (around 40 taka per student a year), or very 
low (only 27 taka per student a year) for nongovernment FFE schools.
6  Both government 
and nongovernment schools under the FFE program are more intensively inspected than 
schools that are not in the program.  Over 90 percent of teachers in both the FFE and non-
FFE schools received training.  More teachers in nongovernment schools are engaged in 
private tutoring compared to government schools, and this is true for both FFE and non-
FFE schools. 
Table 3 shows that the educational qualifications of teachers in FFE and non-FFE 
schools are about the same.  However, teachers in government schools have higher 
education levels than nongovernment schoolteachers.  About 32 percent of government  
                                                 
6 School operating expenses exclude teacher salaries, and include the costs of stationery and supplies, repair 
and maintenance, utilities, and communication.  Information on school expenses was not available for the 
non-FFE, nongovernment schools. 12 
Table 2  General information, by type of schools 
  FFE schools    Non-FFE schools 
Information Government 
Non-
government All Government 
Non-
government All 
Number of students per school in 
2000  350 315  343  286 162  270 
Proportion of girls (percent of total)  50.0 50.0  50.0  50.0 48.3  49.9 
Average number of teachers per 
school  4.7 3.9  4.5  4.4 4.0  4.4 
Share of female teachers (percent of 
all teachers)  28.9  29.3  29.2  33.1  ￿  ￿ 
Average operating expenses per 
student  (taka/year)*   43   27    40   41  ￿  ￿ 
Inspection made by school 
inspectors in 1999 (percent of 
schools) 100.0  92.9  98.6 88.6  80.0  87.5 
Number of inspections in 1999  5.7 3.4  5.2    5.1 2.4  4.8 
Fully follow curriculum (percent of 
schools) 94.6  92.9  94.3   91.4  100.0  92.5 
Teachers who received subcluster 
training (percent of schools) 94.3  90.9  93.7    98.1  100.0  98.3 
Teachers engaged in private tutoring 
(percent of teachers)  14.3  50.0  21.4    25.7  80.0  32.5 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
Note:  Ellipsis (￿) indicates information was not available.  School operating expenses exclude teacher salaries, and 
include the costs of stationery and supplies, repair and maintenance, utilities, and communication. 
 
schoolteachers have a bachelor￿s degree or above.  In contrast, only 9.3 percent of all 
nongovernment schoolteachers have a bachelor￿s degree.  There is almost no difference 
in teacher salaries between FFE and non-FFE schools.  However, the average salary of a 
government schoolteacher is about 3.5 times higher than that of a nongovernment 
schoolteacher.  Further, most nongovernment schoolteachers are not paid regularly.  In all 
types of schools, each teacher teaches about four classes per day and five subjects per 
week. 
Table 3 also indicates that, mainly due to much higher salaries, government 
schoolteachers are better-off than nongovernment schoolteachers, as reflected by the 
relative levels of monthly household expenditures.  School salary accounts for about 
three-fourths of total income of government schoolteachers, whereas it accounts for only 
27 percent of total income of nongovernment schoolteachers.  Nongovernment 
schoolteachers mainly depend on agriculture for their livelihood, and are therefore less 
likely to devote themselves to teaching full-time. 13 
Table 3  Information about teachers 
FFE schools  Non-FFE schools   

















Educational qualifications (percent of teachers)         
  S.S.C.  37.4  43.6  38.5   34.2 55.0  36.5    36.2 46.7 
  H.S.C.  29.8  43.6  32.2   31.0 40.0  32.0    30.2 42.7 
  Other  1.5  10.9  24.6   28.4 5.0  25.7   27.8 9.3 
Number of classes taught per day  3.9  -  3.2  5.2 -  4.5    4.3 - 
    -  1.3  0.6 -  0.6    1.2 - 
   4.2  4.0   4.0  4.4  4.1    4.0  4.3 
Number of subjects taught  5.3  4.9 5.3   5.2  5.1 5.1    5.3  4.9 
Monthly salary (taka)  4,519  1,279 3,960   4,306  1,300 3,960    4,439  1,285 
Receive salary regularly (percent of 
teachers)  95.8 36.4  85.5  99.4  20.0 90.3    97.1  32.0 
Monthly household expenditure 
(taka)  7,013 3,996  6,489  6,956  4,265 6,635    6,991  4,072 
Source of income (percent of total income) 
  School salary  74.8  29.1  66.9  69.0 20.0  63.4   72.7 26.7 
  Agriculture  12.2  56.4  19.9  18.1 75.0  24.6   14.4 61.3 
  Small business  1.9  7.3 2.8   1.3  -  1.1   1.7  5.3 
  Large business  1.1  3.6  1.6  1.3 5.0  1.7   1.2 4.0 
  Other  3.8 1.8  3.5  7.7 -  6.9  5.3  1.3 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
 
 
School-Level Effects on Learning 
The main focus of our study is to assess the effects of FFE on learning.  The 
relative quality of education in FFE and non-FFE schools could be judged on the basis of 
student/teacher ratio, number of students per classroom, and students￿ academic 
achievement test scores. 
A large student-teacher ratio is often seen as detrimental to the quality of 
education.  Since the inception of the FFE program in 1993, the number of teachers per 
school has remained virtually constant, while student enrollment has increased 
significantly in FFE schools.  As a result, there are more students per teacher in FFE 
schools than in non-FFE schools.  On average, whereas there were 61 students per 
teacher in non-FFE schools, FFE schools had 76 students per teacher in 2000.  Of the 
nongovernment schools, FFE schools had 81 students per teacher, whereas those without 
the FFE program had only 41 students per teacher in 2000 (calculated from Table 2). 14 
IFPRI￿s recent evaluation of the FFE program suggests that the overall rate of 
class attendance is 70 percent in FFE schools and only 58 percent in non-FFE schools 
(Ahmed and del Ninno 2002).  Because of increased enrollment and class attendance 
rates, classrooms of FFE schools are more crowded than non-FFE school classrooms.  
Data in Table 4 indicate that, on the average, FFE school classrooms have about 22 
percent more students than non-FFE school classrooms. 
Table 4  Average class size:  School survey results 
  Grade 1  Grade 2  Grade 3  Grade 4  Grade 5  All grades 
  (Number of students per class) 
FFE  schools  87 69 68 61 51 67 
    Government  87 69 69 62 54 68 
    Nongovernment  85 67 63 60 41 63 
Non-FFE  schools  70 60 55 48 43 55 
    Government  73 64 59 52 46 59 
    Nongovernment  47 35 31 26 23 32 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000:  School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
 
To measure learning, we used the results of a standard academic achievement test 
that was administered to students.  This test was given to all fourth-grade students in FFE 
and non-FFE schools, as explained in Section 2.  Table 5 reports on the test scores.  In 
general, high standards are maintained in Bangla, but test outcomes are disappointing for 
English.  Students are intermediate performers in mathematics. 
Table 5 shows that the average test scores are lower in FFE schools (49.1 percent 
of correct answers) than in non-FFE schools (52.0 percent of correct answers), and this 
difference is statistically significant.  Within FFE schools, the average test score of FFE 
beneficiary students (45.6 percent of correct answers) is statistically significantly less 
than that of the nonbeneficiary students (53.2 percent of correct answers), which brings 
down the aggregate score in FFE schools.  FFE beneficiaries score lower than 
nonbeneficiaries probably because of their relatively lower socioeconomic status. 
Table 5 also shows that, the difference in test score is larger between government 
and nongovernment schools than that between FFE and non-FFE schools, with 
government school students performing better than nongovernment school students 15 
(Table 5).  Government primary schools have better facilities, have more qualified 
teachers, and provide higher incentives to teachers compared to nongovernment primary 
schools. 
Table 5  Student achievement test scores at the fourth-grade level:  School survey results 
Average rate of correct answers 













(Percent of correct answers) 
All FFE schools  67.6  27.9  47.3  49.1 
  Government schools  69.2  29.0  48.7  50.5 
    FFE beneficiary students  65.8  27.5 45.5 47.6 
    Nonbeneficiary students  72.7  30.6  52.2  53.5 
  Nongovernment schools  57.5  20.4  38.2  40.1 
    FFE beneficiary students  53.5  17.6 33.9 36.3 
    Nonbeneficiary students  67.8  27.7  49.4  49.9 
  All beneficiary students  63.6  25.7 43.4 45.6 
  All nonbeneficiaries in FFE  schools  72.3  30.4 51.9 53.2 
All Non-FFE schools  70.2  30.7  50.5  52.0 
  Government schools  70.3  31.3  51.7  52.7 
  Nongovernment schools  68.4  23.4  35.6  43.7 
All nonbeneficiary students in all  schools 71.4  30.5 51.3 52.7 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI’s "Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey," Bangladesh. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the differences in student achievement between FFE 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries.  In addition to showing average rates of correct 
responses, Figure 1 also shows the share of children in each category scoring at least 40 
percent of correct responses.  The cutoff point of 40 percent is consistent with FFE 
policy.  In 1998/99, in order to improve educational quality in FFE schools, the 
Government of Bangladesh imposed a number of requirements for the schools as well as 
the program beneficiaries to maintain their FFE status.  One of these requirements is that 
students in Grades 3, 4, and 5 obtain at least 40 percent of total points on the previous 
year￿s annual examination. 
Achievement test scores presented in Table 6 suggest that gender influences 
student achievement.  Boys consistently outperformed girls in all subjects in all types of 
schools (government and nongovernment), regardless of FFE beneficiary status.  The 
difference in test scores between all boys and all girls is statistically significant.  Figure 2  16 














illustrates the differences in achievement between FFE beneficiary students and 
nonbeneficiary students, and between all boys and all girls, with girls showing lower 
achievement than boys in all cases. 
Do crowded classrooms reduce student achievement?  If they do, then the concern 
that increased enrollment and attendance due to FFE compromise learning may be a valid 












all subjects  Type of school and 
program participation  Boys Girls Boys  Girls  Boys Girls Boys  Girls 
    (Percent of correct answers)    
FFE  beneficiaries  64.3 62.9 28.6  23.2  47.1 40.1 48.1  43.5 
All  Nonbeneficiaries  73.3 69.8 32.9  28.5  55.6 47.7 55.6  50.2 
Nonbeneficiaries in FFE 
schools  74.4 70.5 31.7  29.3  56.1 48.4 55.9  50.9 
Nonbeneficiaries in Non-FFE 
schools  71.7 68.8 34.4  27.4  55.0 46.6 55.2  49.1 
Government  schools  70.8 68.3 32.1  27.4  53.6  46  53.8  48.7 
Nongovernment  schools  60.2 58.5 23.2  19.1  41.1 35.3 42.9  38.9 
All  students  69.6 67.0 31.1  26.4  52.2 44.6 52.6  47.5 





















































Average percent of correct answers in all subjects
Percent of students achieving a minimum of 40% of correct answers17 



















one.  To observe whether there is such a relationship, we compare survey data on class 
size with achievement test scores in Figure 3.  No negative correlation is apparent 
between fourth-grade class size and fourth-grade test scores.  This is, however, a rather 
unrefined comparison in the sense that the effect of class size is not isolated from 
probable effects of other factors on achievement.  In a multivariate framework in the later 
part of our paper, we attempt to control for such other factors, thereby measuring the true 
effect of crowded classrooms on student achievement. 
Household-Level Analysis 
Here we use household survey data including the results of achievement test given 
to children at their home to assess what household-level factors influence child academic 
achievement.  As noted in Section 4, the sample of students who took the test at home is 
much smaller than the sample of students in the school survey.  The sample of 
households was randomly drawn from the village census list of households with at least 

























































according to their place of residence in either FFE program or nonprogram unions.  We 
then illustrate and discuss the results of our analysis of the effects of household-level 
factors on learning. 























Profile of Survey Households 
Table 7 presents the characteristics of households living in FFE and non-FFE 
unions, disaggregated by per capita expenditure quartiles.
7  In the FFE program unions, 
about half (52 percent) of all households with primary-school-age children are program 
                                                 
7 Quartile groups are based on household quartiles ranked by total per capita expenditures.  ￿Expenditure 
quartile￿ should be understood to mean households in any of the two strata￿FFE unions and non-FFE 
unions.  In this study, we use per capita expenditure as a proxy for income for two reasons.  First, 
expenditures are likely to reflect permanent income and are, hence, a better indicator of consumption 
behavior (Friedman 1957).  Second, data on expenditures are generally more reliable and stable than 
income data.  Because expenditures are intended to proxy for income, the terms ￿expenditure￿ and 
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FFE schools Non-FFE schools19 
beneficiaries.  The results presented in the first two rows in Table 7 indicate that the 
distribution of FFE beneficiaries is somewhat progressive.  About 60 percent of the 
households in the poorest quartile (i.e., the bottom 25 percent of households in the 
income distribution) are program beneficiaries, compared to 37 percent of the households 
in the richest quartile that receive FFE benefits.  However, this pattern also shows 
evidence of mistargeting, as many households in the higher income groups are included 
in the program.  About 45 percent of all FFE beneficiary households belong to the richer 
half of all households. 
Table 7  Characteristics of respondent households, by per capita expenditure quartile:  
Household survey results 
Per capita expenditure quartiles 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
F F E   u n i o n s        
  FFE beneficiary households (percent)     60    53    57    37    52 
  Percent of all beneficiaries    29.0    25.6    27.5    17.9    100.0 
  Percent of households with primary-school-
age children not going to school    19    17    7    8    13 
  Years of schooling, father    0.9    1.9    2.7    3.9    2.3 
  Years of schooling, mother    0.5    0.9    1.1    2.4    1.2 
  No schooling, adult male (percent)    66    59    53    36    54 
  No schooling, adult female (percent)    83    80    77    50    73 
  Per capita monthly expenditure (taka)    335    498    671   1,474    745 
Non-FFE  unions       
  Percent of households with primary-school-
age children not going to school   20   32    16   8    19 
  Years of schooling, father    0.8    1.6    3.3    5.0    2.7 
  Years of schooling, mother    0.2    0.9    1.5    3.7    1.6 
  No schooling, adult male (percent)    56    68    56    24    51 
  No schooling, adult female (percent)    92    80    76    36    71 
  Per capita monthly expenditure (taka)    356    521    728   1,597    800 




The results suggest that, for households with primary-school-age children in the 
first two quartiles (the bottom 50 percent of all households), about 36 percent in FFE 
unions and 52 percent in non-FFE unions do not send their children to school.  Overall, 
about 13 percent of all households in FFE unions and 19 percent in non-FFE unions do 20 
not send their children to school.  This pattern could be an indication of the success of 
FFE in attracting children from poorer families to attend school. 
The average years of parents￿ schooling are very low.  Moreover, among the adult 
household members, over half of all adult males and almost three-quarters of all adult 
females never attended school.  In both FFE and non-FFE unions, educational attainment 
of parents and other adults is positively correlated with income. 
The FFE program was designed to target the most ￿economically backward￿ 
unions in each thana.  As mentioned in Section 4, the FFE and non-FFE samples of 
unions were randomly drawn, respectively, from the lists of all FFE and non-FFE unions 
in a thana, rather than matching FFE and non-FFE unions on any characteristics.  
Therefore, we expect the FFE unions to be poorer than the non-FFE unions by design.  A 
comparison of average household incomes (in terms of per capita expenditure) between 
FFE unions and non-FFE unions from Table 7 suggests that households in FFE unions 
are indeed somewhat poorer than households in non-FFE unions.  The average household 
income in FFE unions is 6.9 percent lower than the average income in non-FFE unions, 
but this difference is not statistically significant. 
Household-Level Effects on Student Achievement 
Does a family￿s economic welfare affect child learning?  Figure 4 portrays the 
relationship between per capita consumption expenditures (as a proxy for income) and 
achievement test scores of children from the same households.  There is a positive 
correlation between the level of family income and child learning, and this relationship is 
more pronounced for households living in FFE unions.  Children from families who are a 
part of the richest quartile scored 47 percent higher on the tests than the children from 
families who belong to the poorest quartile. 
Figure 5 demonstrates that parental education also has an influence on 
achievement.  Children with a parent who completed at least secondary school scored 56  21 
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percent higher than children with parents who never attended school.  Parents with higher 
educational attainment presumably place more importance on their children￿s education 
than the parents who acquired inadequate or no education. 
The household survey results shown in Figure 6 suggest that the average monthly 
per capita expenditure of nonbeneficiary households with children attending FFE schools 
(974 per taka month) is 60 percent higher than that of FFE beneficiary households (608 
taka per month).
8  This income difference is statistically significant.  The average per 
capita expenditure of nonbeneficiary households living in non-FFE unions with school-
going children (843 taka per month) is about 13 percent lower than that of nonbeneficiary 
households living in FFE unions.  However, this difference is not statistically significant. 
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Per capita monthly expenditure Average achievement test score 23 
Our school-level analysis (with robust achievement test results from a large 
sample) above suggests that the average test score of FFE beneficiary students is 
significantly lower than that of the nonbeneficiary students in FFE schools.  Further, the 
average score of nonbeneficiary students in non-FFE union schools is slightly lower than 
that of the nonbeneficiary students in FFE schools (see Table 5 and Figure 1).  The 
achievement test results from a much smaller subsample of students from the household 
survey also show a similar pattern (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 plots household income and household-level test scores, which shows a 
clear and positive association between income and learning for the above three groups of 
FFE beneficiary and nonbeneficiary households.  This result indicates that one of the 
main reasons why FFE beneficiary students performed worse on achievement tests than 
their fellow nonbeneficiary students in the same FFE schools is because they come from 
poorer families.  Children from poor families are less likely to have educated parents (see 
Figure 5 above) who could help them in their studies at home, to afford study materials at 
home (books, stationery, etc.), and to find enough time to do the homework, as many of 
them must contribute to their family livelihood.  Furthermore, from birth, children from 
poor families are often deprived of the basic nutritional building blocks that they need in 
order to learn easily.  Therefore, FFE beneficiary students, who mostly come from poor 
families, are less likely to have adequate cognitive ability to learn, possibly due to their 
lower nutritional status at preschool age. 
Figure 7 shows a positive relationship (though not strong) between income and 
nutritional status of preschool age children (aged 6 to 60 months) for households living in 
FFE and non-FFE unions.  The nutritional status of preschoolers is expressed in Z-score 
values for weight-for-age (a measure of underweight), which is a combination of the 24 
effects of weight-for-height (wasting) and height-for-age (stunting).
9  The differences of 
the average Z-scores between expenditure quartile groups are not statistically significant. 






















We now turn to an analysis that combines educational quality with quantity for 
the FFE and non-FFE communities.  Following Michaelowa (2001), we constructed an 
indicator that captures quality and enrollment simultaneously to represent the total 
educational attainment in a society.  We first set a threshold of minimum learning at 40 
percent of correct answers in the achievement test for fourth graders.  The rationale for 
our choice of this cutoff point has been explained above.  The indicator￿minimum 
learning achievement￿is then calculated by multiplying the share of all fourth grade 
students at and above the threshold of minimum learning by the fourth grade enrollment 
                                                 
9 Z-score = (actual measurement ￿ 50
th percentile standard)/standard deviation of 50
th percentile standard.  
The growth standards devised by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) are used in this 
study.  A Z-score value of zero indicates a child who is ￿normal,￿ and a Z-score value less than ￿2 indicates 
















































FFE unions Non-FFE unions25 
rate.  We calculated this indicator separately for FFE unions and non-FFE unions.  To 
calculate the minimum learning threshold, we used achievement test scores from the 
school survey.  The data used to calculate the ratio of students in fourth grade to the 
number of all fourth-grade-aged children (aged 9-10 years) in a community￿the gross 
enrollment rate for fourth grade￿came from the household survey. 
Figure 8 shows the minimum learning achievement in FFE and non-FFE 
communities.  The share of all fourth-grade students achieving at least 40 percent of total 
test score is 61.0 percent in the FFE community and 65.7 percent in the non-FFE 
community.  As mentioned earlier, relatively low scores of FFE beneficiary students 
bring down the aggregate score in FFE unions.  On the other hand, the fourth-grade gross 
enrollment rate in FFE unions (47.1 percent) is higher than that in non-FFE unions (41.4 
percent), because the FFE program entices more children to schools in FFE unions.  The 
net result is that the minimum learning achievement in the FFE community (28.7 percent) 
is actually slightly higher than that in the non-FFE community (27.2 percent). 
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FFE unions Non-FFE unions26 
Multivariate Analysis 
The descriptive statistics presented above do not permit the separation of program 
effects from the effects of other factors.  Therefore, we used an appropriately formulated 
multivariate analysis to isolate the effects of other factors to capture the true effects of the 
FFE program on learning. 
Description of the Model 
To determine the impact of the FFE program on the quality of education, 
researchers must take into account the characteristics of the students who decided to 
enroll in school because of the FFE program.  As the above descriptive analysis suggests, 
these students are likely to be of lower ability than students who enrolled in school 
regardless of the FFE program.  Therefore, a na￿ve comparison between schools with the 
FFE program and schools without the FFE program would show that students in FFE 
schools had lower average test scores than schools without the FFE program.  The 
relevant research question is whether children who would have been in school without 
the FFE program are now performing worse on tests because lower ability children are 
enrolled or because classrooms are crowded.  These peer effects would be an indirect 
negative impact of the FFE program on children￿s performance in school.
10 
To investigate the possible negative impacts of the FFE program on learning, our 
analysis focuses on the achievement scores of the students who are not beneficiaries of 
the FFE program.  The idea is to capture the spillover effects or negative externalities of 
the FFE program on the students who are not eligible to receive FFE rations. 
In the sample, two types of primary-school students are nonbeneficiaries of the 
FFE program.  The first group consists of children whose families are not eligible for 
benefits, although they live in unions with the FFE program and send their children to an 
FFE school.  The second group consists of primary school students who live in unions 
                                                 
10 Another relevant research question is whether the students who enroll in school because of the FFE 
program are learning ￿enough￿ to justify the costs of schooling to the government and the opportunity cost 
of the children￿s time.  The data are not detailed enough to answer this question. 27 
that did not have the program in 2000, so that even if the children were poor, they did not 
have access to the program.
11 
In our model, student achievement (T), the test score taken from the school 
survey, is determined by a set of explanatory variables.  We estimate the following 
equation: 
T = α + β gender of student + χ FFE school  
+ δ percentage of fourth-grade students receiving FFE  
+ φ classroom crowding + γ teachers￿ characteristics  
+ η school processes + ι physical characteristics of schools 
+ µ union control variables + ε,   (1) 
 
where α is a scalar, β, χ, δ, φ, γ, η, ι, and µ are parameters of corresponding explanatory 
variables, and ε is an error term. 
The dependent variable, T, is the achievement test score taken from the school 
survey, which covered 3,369 fourth-grade students in 110 schools.  Only the 
nonbeneficiary students are chosen for the analysis.  With missing data and the selection 
of nonbeneficiaries, a total of 1,978 observations are used.  The achievement test score is 
the sum of the scores in Bangla and in mathematics, the most important subjects in 
primary school. 
The controls for whether the school has an FFE program, the percentage of 
children in fourth grade who participate in the FFE program, and for crowding allow for a 
distinction among different impacts that the FFE program might have on student 
achievement.  FFE school is a dummy variable equal to one if the school is an FFE 
school.  To continue being eligible to receive FFE benefits, schools must meet a set of 
minimum educational quality standards, which might have a positive impact on student 
                                                 
11 The FFE program targets children from poor households, most of who would not have attended school 
without the program. The socioeconomic status of the nonbeneficiary students in FFE schools, therefore, 
can roughly be compared with that of the students in non-FFE schools. As mentioned earlier in this report, 
the average monthly per capita expenditure of nonbeneficiary households with children attending FFE 
school is not statistically significantly different from the average per capita expenditure of households with 
children attending non-FFE primary schools. 28 
achievement.
12  On the other hand, schools in poorer unions are more likely to be 
designated FFE schools than schools in richer unions, so the FFE dummy variable could 
indicate a poor school, which would tend to lower achievement. 
The number of students in fourth-grade classrooms measures the crowding effect.  
Because the schools included in the sample have only one room per grade, the number of 
students enrolled in the school in the fourth grade is a measure of fourth-grade students 
per classroom. 
The inclusion of both the percentage of fourth-grade students who participate in 
the FFE program and the number of students in the fourth-grade classrooms in the 
regression allows for a distinction between peer effects and resource dilution effects on 
nonbeneficiary students￿ achievement.  Resource dilution effects result when class 
resources, such as the teacher￿s time, or classroom seating, are divided among increasing 
numbers of students.  In a class of 20, teachers can spend an average of 3 minutes per 
hour per student, but in a class of 40, teachers can only spend an average of 1.5 minutes 
per hour on each student. 
As the percentage of children who receive the FFE program increases, the 
percentage of poor, low ability students is also likely to increase.  If the achievement of 
nonbeneficiary students decreases as the percentage of children who receive the FFE 
program increases, then that is an indication of negative peer effects. 
If the FFE program results in more children in the classroom, and therefore 
resources such as the teacher￿s time and attention are diluted, then the impact of the 
number of children in the fourth grade on nonbeneficiary student achievement should be 
negative.  Controlling for both FFE school status and the percentage of children who 
receive the FFE program distinguishes between the effect of having the FFE program and 
the extent of the program. 
                                                 
12 The minimum quality standards are (1) at least 10 percent of Grade 5 students must qualify for the annual 
scholarship examination, (2) students in Grades 3, 4, and 5 should obtain at least 40 percent of total points 
in the previous year￿s annual examination, and (3) the FFE ration is suspended for any school in which a 
random inspection reveals less than 60 percent attendance, until the attendance record improves. 29 
Teachers￿ characteristics include the percentage of teachers in the school who are 
female, the number of teachers in the school who have at least a bachelor￿s degree, the 
average teacher salary in the school, and the proportion of teachers in the school who 
have other sources of income besides teaching, which is an indicator of the teachers￿ 
dedication to teaching.  Although many other teacher characteristic variables are 
available in the data, such as teachers￿ experience, the teacher variables tend to be highly 
correlated, especially with a variable indicating that the school is a government school.  
Teacher experience, teacher salary, and working in a government school are positively 
correlated.  Regression results that included a dummy variable for government school and 
excluded the teachers￿ salary variable were no different from the regression results of 
equation (1). 
The school processes variables include the number of inspections per year by 
government officials, whether parents attend meetings at the school, and whether students 
are given daily homework assignments.  The physical characteristics variables include 
whether the school has electricity, the number of blackboards, and whether classrooms 
were classified by the survey interviewers as being in poor condition. 
The regression includes a series of dummy variables that control for the union-
level fixed effects.  Because the government attempted to give priority to poorer unions 
in the FFE program, the regression controls for these union characteristics in the most 
comprehensive manner.  If the variables were left out, the estimates of the impact of 
attending an FFE school would be biased because the error term would be correlated with 
the FFE school dummy variable.  This set of union dummy variables also controls for the 
fact that students who are nonbeneficiaries in schools that do not have the FFE program 
are, on average, likely to be poorer than students who are nonbeneficiaries in schools that 
have the FFE program.  Some poor children go to school even if they do not receive an 
FFE ration.  One could add a variable controlling for the per capita expenditure of the 
nonbeneficiaries aggregated to the union level, but adding the union-level dummy 
variable is equivalent to controlling for this variable, as well as any other union-level 
characteristic, both observed and unobserved. 30 
The statistical analysis takes into account the nature of the dependent variable and 
the survey sampling design so as to make correct statistical inferences.  The achievement 
test score ranges from 0 to 19, and therefore the regression is estimated as a Tobit model 
using the ￿svyintreg￿ command in Stata.  This command takes into account the fact that 
the dependent variable is censored at 0 and 19, instead of a continuous variable that goes 
from positive to negative infinity.  The command also corrects the standard errors for 
sampling effects￿in this case, that the sample was stratified to include both unions that 
participated in the FFE program and did not participate, and that the random sampling 
occurred at the union level and not at the individual level. 
Endogeneity problems could arise in the econometric model specification in 
equation (1) if school characteristics and school achievement test scores were both caused 
by characteristics that were not observed by the researcher.  In the Appendix, we argue 
that in the rural Bangladesh setting, endogeneity is not the problem that often arises in 
other settings. 
Results and Discussion 
The mean, minimum, and maximum values for the variables used in the 
regression analysis are presented in Table 8.  The results of the Tobit model estimation 
are presented in Table 9.  To aid interpretation, the predicted achievement scores from a 
series of simulations that use the estimated coefficients from Table 9 are presented in 
Table 10. 
The FFE program has a statistically significant positive impact on the 
achievement test scores of the nonbeneficiary students.  Students who do not receive FFE 
benefits but go to an FFE school have significantly higher achievement test scores than 
students who do not attend FFE schools, controlling for union characteristics.  However, 
this effect is mitigated to some extent by the negative and statistically significant ￿peer 
effect￿ on achievement test scores of nonbeneficiary students, which arise from the 
percentage of students in the classroom who receive FFE benefits. 31 
Table 8  Descriptive statistics for variables used in regression analysis, nonbeneficiary 
students, 2000 
Variable Mean  Minimum  Maximum 
Achievement test score = sum of Bangla and mathematics scores    11.60    0    19 
Male  student    0.46   0   1 
School has FFE program    0.58    0    1 
Percentage of students who participate in FFE in Grade 4    0.25    0    0.71 
Measure of crowding￿total number of children in Grade 4 classroom    70.27    14    180 
Percentage of female teachers   0.30    0    0.80 
Number of teachers with at least a Bachelors degree    1.54    0    5 
Teachers￿ average salary per month    4,384.85    1,300    10,577 
Percentage of teachers who report other sources of income    0.20    0    1 
Number of inspections in last school year    5.65    0    14 
Parental participation￿parents come to school meetings    0.74    0    1 
Children are given daily homework    0.86    0    1 
School  has  electricity    0.34   0   1 
Classrooms in poor condition as observed by survey enumerators    0.04    0    1 
Number of blackboards in school    4.84    0    74 
N   1978     
 
 
Table 9  Tobit regression analysis of the impact of the FFE program on the fourth-grade 
achievement test scores of nonbeneficiary students, 2000 
Variable Coefficient  t-test 
Male student  1.109  2.35* 
School has FFE program  6.812  2.40* 
Percentage of students who participate in FFE in Grade 4  -9.928  -2.53* 
Measure of crowding￿total number of children in Grade 4 classroom  0.020  1.36 
Teacher characteristics at the school level     
  Percentage of female teachers  -0.954  -0.58 
  Number of teachers with at least a bachelor￿s degree  0.364  1.26 
  Teachers￿ average salary per month  0.000  0.82 
  Percentage of teachers who report other sources of income  -0.522  -0.39 
School processes     
  Number of inspections in last school year  0.060  0.57 
  Parental participation￿parents come to school meetings  -0.386  -0.59 
  Children are given daily homework  0.459  0.30 
Physical characteristics of schools     
  School has electricity  2.310  1.81+ 
  Classrooms in poor condition as observed by survey enumerators  -0.543  -0.55 
  Number of blackboards in school  0.043  2.15* 
Union dummies (F test, 18, 30)  Yes 5,991.69** 
N 1,978   
Sigma (goodness of fit)  5.36  33.10** 
Notes:  Significance levels:  + significant at the 10 percent level; * significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at 
the 1 percent level. 32 
Table 10  Simulations of predicted values of learning achievement under various scenarios, 





of correct answers 




School has no FFE program  10.4  54.9  ￿ 
School has FFE program, 0 percent of students 
receive FFE benefits  17.2  90.7  65.2 
School has FFE program, 44 percent of students 
receive FFE benefits (mean value)  12.9 67.7  23.3 
School has FFE program, percentage of students 
who receive FFE benefits increases by 10 
percentage points to 54 percent  11.9 62.5  -7.7 
School has no electricity  11.2  58.7  ￿ 
School has electricity  13.5  70.9  20.7 
School has 0 blackboards  11.7  61.7  ￿ 
School has 4.8 blackboards (mean value)  11.9  62.8  1.8 
School doubles the number of blackboards to 9.6  12.1  63.9  3.6 
 
The simulation is useful to see whether the positive effect of going to an FFE 
school is larger in magnitude than the negative impact of having a non-zero percentage of 
children receiving FFE benefits.  The simulations present different scenarios.  For 
example, the first row of Table 10 presents the predicted achievement test score that 
would be obtained if no schools had the FFE program.  To calculate the predicted score, 
the variables ￿FFE school￿ and ￿percentage of children in fourth grade who receive FFE 
benefits￿ are set equal to 0 and then the mean score is calculated for all the 
nonbeneficiary students in the sample.  In schools without the FFE program, on average, 
students would get 10.4 points on the achievement test, or 54.9 percent of the 
achievement test questions correct. 
The scenario presented in the second row of Table 10 shows what would be the 
average score of nonbeneficiary students in FFE schools if there were no FFE 
beneficiaries in fourth-grade classrooms, hence, no peer effect.  The value of the variable 
￿FFE school￿ is set to 1 and the ￿percentage of children in fourth grade who receive FFE 
benefits￿ is kept at 0.  Achievement test scores would increase by 65 percent to 90.7 33 
percent correct answers compared to the no FFE program baseline (row 1).
13  Comparing 
row 2 to row 1 gives us the gross effect of being in an FFE school. 
In the third row of Table 10, the value of ￿FFE school￿ is set to 1 and ￿the 
percentage of children who receive FFE benefits￿ is set to 44, which is the average 
percentage of children in fourth grade who receive FFE benefits in schools that have the 
FFE program.  A comparison of the first and third rows shows that the net impact of the 
FFE program is to increase school achievement test scores of nonbeneficiaries from 10.4 
points to 12.9 points (from 54.9 percent to 67.7 percent correct answers), or by 23 
percent. 
When the percentage of FFE beneficiary students in a fourth grade FFE classroom 
reaches 68.6 percent, then the negative peer effect arising from a high percentage of FFE 
children in the classroom exceeds the positive impact of being in an FFE school for the 
nonbeneficiary students.  Figure 9 illustrates the predicted impacts of the FEE program 
on student achievement under different scenarios presented above. 
The simulations also show what happens when the percentage of children who 
receive the FFE programs increases in an FFE school.  Comparing rows 3 and 4 of Table 
10, when the percentage of students receiving the FFE program increases by ten 
percentage points from 44 percent to 54 percent, the predicted test score falls from 12.9 
points to 11.9 points (67.7 percent correct answers to 62.5 percent correct answers), or a 
decrease of 7.7 percent. 
The class size or crowding effect is not statistically significant.  As the number of 
children in fourth-grade classrooms increases, there is no statistically significant impact 
on achievement test scores.  This finding is consistent with other findings in the literature, 
which have also found little impact of class size on student achievement (Glewwe 2002; 
Hanushek 2003; Michaelowa 2001).  In the rural Bangladesh context, the finding is not 
                                                 
13 The result should be interpreted with caution, because this simulation is an out-of-sample prediction￿
only 2 percent of nonbeneficiary fourth grade students in FFE schools have no students participating in the 
FFE program in their grade. 34 

























likely due to disruptive students being placed in smaller classrooms, because most rural 
primary schools do not have the resources to provide more than one class at a grade level.  
These schools are not accountable to parent associations and parents have little say in 
school decisions.  Therefore, class size is a more random variable in the rural Bangladesh 
context than it is in other countries; thereby, results are less likely to be biased.  The 
finding suggests that the negative impacts of the FFE program on student achievement 
operate primarily through peer effects, and not through class size. 
Of the remaining variables, only whether the school has electricity and the 
number of blackboards in the school have statistically significant impacts on 
nonbeneficiary student achievement test scores.  The effect of increasing the number of 
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to the mean of 4.8 would only increase test scores from 61.7 percent correct to 62.8 
percent correct, or by 2 percent.  Doubling the average number of blackboards from 4.8 
to 9.6 would increase the students￿ scores from 11.92 to 12.14, or by about 2 percent, or 
an increase of 3.6 percent compared to the baseline of no blackboards.  Other studies by 
Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) in Ghana and Michaelowa (2001) in five Sub-Saharan 
African countries have also found positive and significant, but small in magnitude, 
impacts of blackboards on student achievement.  The impact of electricity is sizable.  
Adding electricity to all schools would increase nonbeneficiary achievement test scores 
by 21 percent, from 58.7 percent correct to 70.9 percent correct.  Currently, only 34 
percent of nonbeneficiary children attend schools with electricity.  The result should be 
interpreted with caution, however, because having electricity could be correlated with 
other unobserved characteristics of the school, such as the neighborhood where it is 
located.  Providing electricity to schools might also be very expensive compared to other 
interventions. 
6.  Conclusions 
The evidence is clear from past studies that the Food for Education program in 
Bangladesh has been very successful at getting poor students enrolled in school, 
especially girls.  However, as Bangladesh has not invested in school resources at the 
same rate that enrollment has increased, class sizes have increased.  Parents, teachers, and 
policymakers have expressed concern about decreasing quality of FFE schools, 
specifically about the perceived negative impact of crowding in classrooms on student 
achievement. 
In this paper, we made an effort to identify the determinants of educational 
quality, and investigated the possible negative impacts of the FFE program on learning.  
We used data collected from school and household surveys.  These data sets include 
detailed information about school- and household-level characteristics, and scores from a 
standard achievement test administered to students. 36 
In summary, the results of our analysis at the school-level reveal that the average 
test scores are lower in FFE schools than in non-FFE schools.  About 40 percent of 
students in FFE schools are program beneficiaries and the rest are nonbeneficiaries.  
Within FFE schools, the average score of FFE beneficiaries is less than that of the 
nonbeneficiaries, which brings down the aggregate score in FFE schools.  FFE 
beneficiaries score lower than nonbeneficiaries probably because of their relatively lower 
socioeconomic and nutritional status. 
Gender influences student achievement.  Boys consistently outperformed girls in 
the achievement test, regardless of FFE beneficiary status.  Therefore, interventions 
specifically focused to promote girls￿ performance need to be considered.  Improved 
quality of girls￿ education, in turn, would strengthen and expedite the beneficial effects of 
women￿s education on various family-level outcomes, such as children￿s schooling, child 
health and nutrition, and fertility. 
One of the main sources of children￿s capacity and motivation to learn is the 
quality of family environment.  Evidence from the household survey shows that children 
from poor households do worse on achievement tests than children from rich households.  
Children whose parents are educated do better on achievement tests than children whose 
parents are uneducated.  Children from poor households are also shown to have higher 
incidence of malnutrition than children from rich households, which affects learning. 
To investigate the possible negative impact of the FFE program on test scores, we 
analyze student achievement test data collected in schools in a multivariate framework.  
We focus on the impact of the FFE program on nonbeneficiary students￿ achievement.  
Our approach allows us to distinguish among the effects of students enrolled in an FFE 
school, having a higher percentage of FFE beneficiary children in the classroom, and 
increasing class size. 
The results of our multivariate analysis reveal that the class size has no 
statistically significant effect on student achievement.  Our finding that class size does 
not seem to matter to student achievement in rural Bangladesh is consistence with many 
studies in the economics of education literature.  This finding, therefore, negates the 37 
assertion that the increased number of students in FFE school classrooms￿basically 
resulting from the success of the FFE program￿reduced learning. 
The analysis, however, shows that as the percentage of students who receive the 
FFE program grows, test scores of nonbeneficiary students in FFE schools decrease, 
implying that there are negative peer effects of the FFE program on nonbeneficiary 
students.  For example, FFE beneficiary students are poorer and are likely to be of lower 
cognitive ability than nonbeneficiary students; therefore, teachers may have to pay more 
attention to them than the nonbeneficiary students.  There may be other factors as well.  
We conclude that, although we do find a negative impact of the FFE program on 
achievement of nonbeneficiary students in FFE schools, this negative impact on learning 
operates primarily through peer effects, and not through class size. 
The FFE beneficiary students are poorer and likely to be of lower ability than 
nonbeneficiary students.  High ability and low ability students can be assigned to 
different classes, but this would require more classroom space and teachers.  In rural 
Bangladesh, parents are probably not able to evaluate education quality very well, due to 
their own low-level or no education.  As their education and experience increases, what 
may eventually happen is that wealthier families would take their children out of 
government-supported general primary schools and into well-funded private schools, and 
so the government-supported and private school market will sort children by ability. 
On the other hand, our analysis suggests that the FFE program has a significant 
positive impact on the achievement test scores of the nonbeneficiary students.  Students 
who do not receive FFE benefits but go to an FFE school have significantly higher test 
scores than students who do not attend FFE schools.  This effect probably comes from the 
requirement that FFE schools must meet certain minimum educational quality standards 
in order to maintain their school-level eligibility for the program.  Our simulation results 
suggest that, at the average percentage of FFE beneficiary students in school, the positive 
impact of being in a FFE school outweighs the negative impact of having a non-zero 
percentage of FFE beneficiary students in the classroom. 38 
Setting clear standards for performance is important for all levels of education.  In 
Bangladesh, although performance indicators are embodied in certification examinations 
at the secondary and higher levels, they are neglected at the primary level.  We suggest 
that carefully devised, minimum performance standards be incorporated in the design of 
the recently implemented Primary Education Stipend program, a cash-for-education 
program that has replaced the FFE program, as well as in the ongoing pilot testing of the 
school-feeding program.
14 
Our study provides evidence that FFE beneficiary students bring down the 
aggregate achievement test score in FFE unions.  We have also found that the gross 
enrollment rate in FFE unions is higher than that in nonprogram unions, because the FFE 
program entices more children to school in FFE unions.  We constructed an index of 
community-level minimum learning achievement, calculated by multiplying the share of 
students in a community above the threshold of minimum learning by the enrollment rate 
in that community.  We show that the FFE program has increased the minimum learning 
achievement in the FFE communities, thereby the FFE community as a whole benefited 
by achieving a higher level of quality education compared to non-FFE communities.  
Particularly, major benefits accrued to the children from poor families who would not 
have attended school without the FFE program. 
All in all we conclude that, as a food-based social safety net, the FFE program in 
Bangladesh served a wider purpose than simply providing the poor with immediate 
sustenance through food transfers, important as that is.  It has empowered children from 
poor families with education, thereby paving their pathway out of poverty. 
                                                 
14 In July 2002, in order to alleviate short-term hunger in the classroom and to promote primary school 
enrollment and retention rate, the World Food Programme and the Government of Bangladesh launched the 
school-feeding program in chronically food-insecure areas of Bangladesh.  The program distributes 
micronutrient-fortified biscuits to all children in the intervention schools. 39 
Appendix:  Potential Sources of Endogeneity 
Endogeneity problems could arise in the econometric model employed in this 
study if school characteristics and school achievement test scores were both caused by 
characteristics that were not observed by the researcher.  For example, if parents who 
place a high value on their children￿s schooling spend more time doing homework with 
their children and also choose where to live based on school resources, then the impact of 
school resources on children￿s achievement test scores is overestimated.  Glewwe (2002) 
discusses at length the difficulties of estimating the impact of school resources, especially 
class size, on student achievement. 
We argue that in the rural Bangladesh setting, endogeneity is not the problem that 
often arises in other settings.  In the Bangladesh FFE program case, one might imagine 
that the following endogeneity problems would arise:  the government allocates the FFE 
program and school resources to low-performing areas, leading to an underestimate of the 
impact of school resources on student achievement; parents choose which schools their 
children attend, so that motivated parents choose schools with more resources; and 
parents who care about schooling are able to get more government resources to their 
children￿s schools.  We explain, in turn, why each of these situations does not create an 
endogeneity problem for our study. 
The FFE program is targeted to poor rural areas.  The district administration gets 
funds, which are allocated to the thana-level officials, the lowest level of government 
administration in Bangladesh.  At the thana level, unions are chosen to participate based 
on their socioeconomic levels and their literacy rates.  In the econometric model 
specification in equation (1), we control for this selection by including union dummy 
variables, which control for all observed and unobserved characteristics of the union, 
including those that are used to select the unions for the program.  So, the targeting of the 
FFE program to poor areas is controlled for in the regression, as is any other targeting of 
school resources that occurs at the union level. 40 
All selection of schools into the FFE program occurs at the union level.  When a 
union is chosen for the FFE program, basically all the schools within the union are 
eligible, provided that they meet the regulations.  All the government and registered 
nongovernment schools participate.  Only one madrasa within the union is eligible, but 
only about 4 percent of students in our census attend a madrasa.  The Bangladesh Rural 
advancement Committee (BRAC) is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that 
provides schools in villages at the early primary level.  BRAC opted not to participate in 
the FFE program, but NGOs only enroll about 6 percent of primary-school students. 
The next potential source of endogeneity arises from parental choice of their 
children￿s schools.  In the rural areas, where the data were collected, often only one 
school is available in the village.  The census data collected for this study show that about 
80 percent of children go to a school within their village, and the remaining 20 percent go 
to a school within their union.  Seventy-two percent of students attend government 
schools, and about 13 percent go to nongovernment schools.  Students in rural 
Bangladesh do not have much choice in the schools that they attend.  In the sample of 
school test scores, 64 percent of the children lived in a village where there was only one 
school, and an additional 20 percent lived in a village where there were two schools.  
Therefore, in this setting, the school choice does not create as large of an endogeneity 
problem as it would in other settings, such as an urban area of Bangladesh. 
The final source of potential endogeneity arises from parents being able to 
organize and obtain the political power to improve schools.  Even if only one school is 
available in a village, parents who care about their children￿s education might be able to 
pressure the government to invest more resources in the local school or to build another 
school when the current school gets crowded.  This scenario is unlikely in rural 
Bangladesh.  Parents have little experience with school, and so are unable to judge school 
quality.  Table 7 in this report shows that in FFE unions, on average, fathers have 2.3 
years of schooling and mothers have 1.2 years of schooling.  The people who live in the 
villages are mostly poor and have little political clout.  Schooling resource decisions are 41 
made at higher levels of government, not at local levels, and the administrators of these 
programs often have little incentive to respond to village needs. 
To conclude, endogeneity of school resources and class size is not as much of a problem 
in our study setting as it would be in other settings.  The FFE program created variation 
across schools in class size, and this variation allows us to estimate the impacts of being 
in an FFE school, having a high proportion of students who receive the FFE program, and 
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